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Abstract
This paper aims to analyze the issue of price spikes in electricity markets through the lens
of noncooperative game theory. The case we consider is Australia’s long established National
Electricity Market (NEM). Speciﬁcally, we adapt von der Fehr and Harbord’s [26] multi-unit
auction model to settings that more closely reﬂect the structure of the NEM, showing that price
spikes can be related to a speciﬁable threshold in demand.
JEL Classiﬁcation Codes: C72; Q40; Q47
Keywords: Electricity Markets, Spot Price Behaviour, Non-Cooperative Game Theory.
1 Introduction
The frequency and severity of price spikes in electricity markets, is an issue with increasing traction
in domestic politics [21, 23]. This has clearly been the case in Australia for some time. As the
economics of resources and sustainability receives greater public attention, the issue of energy prices
has become a genuine policy concern. In particular, an inspection into the root causes of price spikes
has far reaching implications for competition and climate change policy.
The issue we address in this paper is the tendency for spot prices in Australia’s National
Electricity Market (NEM) to spike drastically (above $1000/MWh). In addition to this, it is
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1common for daily prices to peak at a level ($100-$1000/MWh) that can be described as irregularly
high. This behaviour tends to aﬀect the pricing of electricity in the long-run, ultimately raising
prices in the retail market. It is no surprise then that this issue is important when it comes to
policy-making. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 track the price behaviour that we wish to explain. Figure 1.1
shows the demand and price proﬁles for New South Wales in January 2007. The most distinct
behavioural property, and the one on which we focus, is the tendency for price to spike as demand
peaks. The other critical observation is that such spot price behaviour is highly non-linear. Figure
1.2, an undated scatter plot of the same price-demand data points, shows us just how random
spiking behaviour can appear relative to demand.
The NEM is Australia’s largest electricity market, with ﬁve states all interconnected via a
combination of high voltage transmission lines. The NEM was established in 1998 and fully in-
terconnected in 2005 and it represents the worlds longest interconnected power system which runs
over 5000 km. The market itself was established as a pool based energy only market to meet
instantaneous demand by perform 5 minute auctions which settle on every half hour. Generators
must submit price and supply bids to the market operator the day before for each 5 minute dis-
patch period for the ensuing day, so that the market operator can meet demand. Generation assets
have historically been government owned with more private investment in generation over the years
since the markets establishment. The main reason for selecting this market for examination is the
availability and clarity of data available. All 5 minute dispatch and 30 min settlement periods have
an enormous amount of data available, including bids, interconnector ﬂows and generation asset
behaviour. Furthermore, the NEM also represents a a fairly unique market with a diverse range of
generation assets and its energy only settlement structure.
Supply auctions for electricity are a common market design. As such, there is a healthy body
of literature dedicated to strategic analysis of price and bidding behaviour in this setting. In
particular, Klemperer and Meyer’s [19] Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) model has been used
extensively for analysis of electricity markets. For example Green and Newbery [15] have used this
approach to argue that, with capacity constraints, the supply function equilibrium is a Cournot
solution. Further work in this area has yielded solutions in cases of completely inelastic demand,
oligopoly and capacity constraints in various combinations [4, 17, 24]. These results have been
used as a basis for the analysis of price behaviour and modeling. Extending beyond closed form
2Figure 1.1: NSW demand and price proﬁle for January 2007 (Demand Red and Price Blue)
3Figure 1.2: Demand-Price Scatter for NSW, January 07
4solutions, there is a body of work that uses numerical SFE solutions to address the complexities
that arise from network and operational constraints [5], diﬀerent cost structures [3] and options
contracts [1, 2].
The other major modeling approach in the analysis of electricity markets is the multi-unit
auction model, ﬁrst used in this context by von der Fehr and Harbord [26]. It has since been
extended to a broader strategic setting by Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord [12], but the thrust
of the key results is very much the same. Both the supply function equilibrium and multi-unit
auction models suggest that serious price eﬀects will arise in the presence of capacity constraints
1. More speciﬁcally, they are likely to arise when one ﬁrm faces periods of completely inelastic
residual demand. All of the modeling done herein works towards this simple yet critical insight into
how electricity markets function. As a theoretical tool, the multi-unit auction model is a far more
accurate representation of the Australia’s’ NEM market design. In particular, it lends itself to a
concise equilibrium analysis and is far more representative of the strategic choices faced by NEM
generators. As such, we opt to use the multi-unit auction model for our analysis. In addition to the
work already mentioned, some theoretical extensions have been made. For example, Dechenaux and
Kovenock [10] oﬀer a complete characterization in oligopoly with elestic demand, while Garca-Daz
and Marin [14] have extended to the case of heterogeneous unit costs.
On the empirical side, there is a growing literature on the use of strategic models, predominately
the SFE and multi-unit approaches, as a structural means to analyze bidding behaviour in electricity
markets. Using NEM data from 1997 and access to proprietary contract information, Wolak [29]
has used optimal bid restrictions to estimate the marginal costs for a Victorian NEM generator.
In a similar spirit to this approach, Sweeting [25] and Hortasu and Puller [18] have analysed bid
behaviour in the England and Wales, and Texas power markets. Wolfram [31] has used von der Fehr
and Harbord’s mixed strategy results as the basis of a regression model for the British electricity
spot market, ﬁnding statistically signiﬁcant evidence in support of the conjecture that generators
in this market strategically manipulate their bids. Using a similar modelling framework to the
multi-unit auction, Crawford, Crespo and Tauchen [8] have deﬁned and characterised “bid function
equilibria”, which they use to derive testable structural equations.
Brennan and Melanie [6], oﬀered analysis, prior to the creation of the NEM in 1998, on the
1In fact it can be shown that a supply function equilibrium can be constructed from the limit of the mixed strategy
equilibrium in the n-unit auction as n → ∞ [22]
5likely price behaviour in such a market. Motivated by the insights of von der Fehr and Harbord
[26] and Green and Newbery [15], they used load duration curves to show that generators in NSW
- Macquarie, Delta and Paciﬁc - face signiﬁcant periods of completely inelastic residual demand.
They argued that the price eﬀects of this, as suggested by the theory, could be serious. There has
not been a great deal of strategic analysis of the NEM since then and its is our objective here to
revisit their argument, with 10 years of data and a range of insights covering the working of the
NEM.
2 The Model
The model we adopt was ﬁrst introduced by von der Fehr and Harbord [26] and subsequently
extended by Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord [12]. In it’s simplest form, two generators engage in
a uniform price supply auction. We assume that marginal costs, ci for generator i, are constant.
Denoting ki for plant i’s capacity, pi as its price bid and Q as (completely inelastic) system demand,





pi if Q < ki






Q if Q < ki






0 if Q < ki
Q − ki if ki < Q
(2.3)
In addition to this, we assume that, in the case of a tie, dispatch is awarded with priority to
the lowest marginal cost producer. Additionally, given that demand Q is treated as completely
inelastic, there is a market maximum p for price. In the NEM this stands as the $10,000 Value
of Lost Load (VOLL). For relevance we assume that Q < k1 + k2 in all cases. Von der Fehr and
Harbord have analysed the equilibrium properties of this game which, allowing for the possession
of multiple generation units, is named the multi-unit auction. We can summarise the ﬁrst set of
key results of their paper [26] in the following proposition.
Theorem 2.1. For completely inelastic demand, Q:
6• If Pr(Q < min{k1,k2}) = 1 then there exist pure strategy equilibria in all of which the system
marginal price is equal to the marginal cost of the least eﬃcient generator and only one
generator produces.
• If Pr(Q > max{k1,k2}) = 1 then all pure strategy equilibria are given by oﬀer price pairs
(p1,p2) with either p1 = p and p2 < p or p1 < p and p2 = p. 2
Proof. This is a very intuitive result. Let us assume, without loss of generality, that ﬁrm 1 is
the most eﬃcient generator (c1 < c2). When Q < min{k1,k2}, either ﬁrm will ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to undercut the other when p > c2. This places an upper bound on p of c2. Firm 1 will ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to undercut ﬁrm 2 with a bid, p1, that is marginally less than c2, to which ﬁrm 2 cannot
proﬁtably respond. Now let Q > max{k1,k2}. If we suppose that both p1 > p and p2 < p, it is
clear that this cannot be an equilibrium, as the marginal ﬁrm may increase proﬁt unambiguously by
increasing its bid and receiving the same dispatch, due to perfectly inelastic demand. Let p1 = p,
then the optimal response for ﬁrm 2 is any p2 < p that is suﬃciently low as to avoid any incentive
for ﬁrm 1 to undercut its bid. The same logic applies in the case where p2 = p. Either outcome is
a pure strategy equilibrium.
The critical issue in a market of this design is capacity. Once demand exceeds the collective
capacity of all but one generator, this one generator faces perfectly inelastic residual demand. The
best response in this situation is naturally to bid the highest possible price p, assuming there is no
greater proﬁt to be made from undercutting the current price. Here, we seek to demonstrate that
the general thrust of this theoretical result holds in oligopoly for a market design with multi-step
bids and multiple regions.
The second aspect of the model that one may consider is uncertainty in demand. Von der Fehr
and Harbord [26] show in the case where both the states Q > max{k1,k2} and Q < min{k1,k2}
have a positive probability of occurrence, no pure strategy equilibrium can exist. In addition, the
mixed strategy equilibrium strikes a balance between bidding low, hence increasing the probability
of being dispatched, and bidding high, which increases expected proﬁt in the event that this bid
becomes system marginal price.
2Refer to von der Fehr and Harbord [26] for further detail on these results.
73 Extending the Model
Having established the critical theoretical properties of the multi-unit auction, we wish to show
how they extend to a market similar to the NEM. We desire an n-ﬁrm model with multi-step bids
and multiple regions. Fabra, von der Fehr and Harbord [12] have already established important
results in oligopoly and multi-step bids, which we will state and reﬁne, before giving some results.
3.1 Multi-step bids
Our results thus far have assumed a duopoly with a single unit bid and so we must now look at
how this extends to non-trivial multi-unit auctions in oligopoly. This is not as involved as it may
seem, and in fact it has been asserted [12, 10] that the pure strategy equilibrium outcomes that we
have detailed are independent of the number of steps allowed in players’ bid functions. We oﬀer
proof of this claim. Let us establish some notation. Let I be the set of players for a multi-unit
auction of order n 3, the strategy choice for generator i is bi = (pi,qi), where pi, qi ∈ Rn are price
and quantity vectors. We denote the combined bid proﬁle b = {bj | j ∈ I} and b−i = {bj | j 6= i}.
Under this construction, von der Fehr, Harbord and Fabra [12] and Dechenaux and Kovenock [10]
asserted that the set of pure strategy equilibrium outcomes in the multi-unit auction is independent
of the number of steps in the bid function. Their results are based on the following reasoning. Let
the multi-unit auction be of order n. Assume generator i is faced with some bid proﬁle b−i. Given
b−i, only one of i’s bids will determine proﬁt, and thus i’s best response can be obtained with only
one bid. As every generator can formulate their best response with a single unit bid, the set of
pure strategy equilibria is unaﬀected by the value of n.
We contend however that proofs by this argument are insuﬃcient. They show only that, in this
game, players’ best responses to one particular opponent proﬁle are unaﬀected by the number of
allowable bid steps. No proof is oﬀered, however, to show how this relates to the equilibria. We
wish to ﬁll out this argument with a very simple lemma, necessary for a complete proof of the
claim.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose we have two games G = (Xi,Ui)N
i=1 and H = (Yi,Ui)N
i=1 with Y ⊂ X, where
3That is, n steps in the bid function





Ui(yi,x−i), ∀i, ∀x−i, (3.1)
and letting y∗
i , x∗












i ,x−i,j) then all equilibria in H and G are equivalent in terms of
pay-oﬀs. Additionally, there exists a mapping ψ : X 7→ Y such that for all equilibria x in G,
U(x) = U (ψ(x)) and ψ(x) is an equilibrium in H.
Proof. We construct ψ explicitly by ψi(x) = argmaxyi∈Yi Ui(yi,x−i). To see that ﬁxed points are
preserved under some best response correspondence, take any equilibrium x∗ in X \ Y . Condition
(3.1) guarantees us that any player can achieve the same proﬁt with a best response in Y , while
(3.2) ensures that the other player’s best responses are unchanged from such a simpliﬁcation in








as we then have by induction on the number of players that
arg max
yi∈Yi
Ui (yi,ψ−i(x∗)) = ψi(x∗), ∀i. (3.4)
This can be shown quite easily, as (3.2) requires that j’s best response in Xj does not change under
the inclusion of ψ(x∗
i) in the proﬁle, while (3.1) guarantees that a payoﬀ equivalent best response
can be found in Yj, for which (3.2) holds as Y ⊂ X. Finally, condition (3.1) guarantees that proﬁts
are the same for x∗ and ψ(x∗) by the same process of induction on n.
Having this result greatly simpliﬁes elements of our analysis where we need to consider the eﬀects
of including multi-unit bids. We are guaranteed now that the pure strategy equilibrium outcomes
will be unaﬀected by such an extension, as we shall later see. This result a simple exposition of
how equilibrium outcomes can be preserved under a permutation to the game via some form of
best response equivalence. This allows us from hereon to treat only the results for the single unit
auction, in the knowledge that any multi-unit results are equivalent. The critical result is the
following:
9Proposition 3.2. The equilibrium results in any multi-unit auction of order n are equivalent in
terms of price and pay-oﬀs to the multi-unit auction of single order.
Proof. Let Bi denote the strategy space for the single unit auction, and Bn
i denote the strategy
space for the auction of order n. We need only to show that conditions (3.1) and (3.2) hold and
we can invoke Lemma 3.1. Suppose that some ﬁrm i faces a bid proﬁle bn
−i. Denote any best
response in Bn
i as bn∗
i . If i becomes the marginal bidder then it’s proﬁt is determined only by one
(pk
i ,qk
i ) ∈ bn∗
i . In this case then a bid b∗
i = (pk
j,qk
j) ∈ Bi would clearly be pay-oﬀ equivalent. If i
is not the marginal generator it is easy to see that proﬁt is determined only by the highest step
(pk
i ,qk
i ) such that pk
i < p and the same argument applies. Thus condition (3.1) is satisﬁed. In
addition, it is easy to see that such a change in strategies has no eﬀect on the proﬁts of the other
ﬁrms. If i is the marginal generator, the proﬁts of every other ﬁrm are determined only by the one
bid step b∗
i and so their best responses are unaﬀected. If i is not the marginal generator, the proﬁt
functions for any of the remaining ﬁrms are similarly unaﬀected by the transformation in strategies
and therefore, trivially, neither are their best responses.
Thus, by Lemma 3.1, any equilibrium proﬁle b∗n can be mapped to a payoﬀ equivalent equilib-
rium b∗ in the single unit auction. Finally, because quantity Q is ﬁxed and we have a uniform price
p, we must necessarily have also that the uniform price outcome p in equilibrium is unchanged.
Proposition 3.2 permits us to analyse only the single unit auction, in the knowledge that the
price outcomes for auctions of any higher order are equivalent.
3.2 Oligopoly
Now suppose that the supply auction is expanded to incorporate an n-ﬁrm oligopoly. Fabra et al
[12] have shown that the basic properties of the duopoly model are preserved. We will illustrate
this in a result similar to Proposition 4 in Fabra et al [12], with the only diﬀerence being that we
assume complete asymmetry in marginal costs. We label each ﬁrm I = {1,2,...,n} in ascending
order of marginal costs (assuming complete asymmetry) and capacities k1,k2,... accordingly. We
denote K−i =
P
j6=i kj as the sum of capacities less generator i.
To establish some intuition for this result, let us suppose that Q < K−i for all i. Where might
the equilibrium lie in this case? Suppose that some generator k is currently the marginal bidder at
10pk. Any generator i with ci < pk can then guarantee themselves a proﬁt by bidding less than pk.
Thus, we can only have an equilibrium once there is no longer an opportunity for any generator to
proﬁtably undercut. So in this case if Q <
Pk−1
i=1 ki, k cannot be the marginal bidder in equilibrium.
This condition establishes that price in equilibrium must be equal to the marginal cost of some
generator, which we shall call a competitive outcome. Let πc
i be the proﬁt to generator i from such











We can now state the following.




   
   
ci+1 if Q ∈ (Qi−1,Qi], ∀ Qi < ˆ Q
cj+1 if Q ∈ (Qj−1, ˆ Q], Qj = mini{Qi | Qi ≥ ˆ Q}
p if Q > ˆ Q
(3.7)
Proof. Suppose that Q ∈ (Qi−1,Qi] and, for contradiction, that p > ci+1. In this case, generators
1 to i + 1 can guarantee themselves a proﬁt by bidding below p. If the marginal bidder was any
j > i+1, they will be undercut. If the marginal bidder is any j ≤ i+1 they will also be undercut by
any of the generators not currently dispatched. Thus p cannot be greater than cj+1 in equilibrium.
Conversely, if p < ci+1 then naturally we expect only generators 1 to i will be dispatched as it is
not proﬁtable for any j > i. This is also not an equilibrium as the marginal bidder can proﬁtably
raise its bid until p = ci+1, leaving this as the only viable equilibrium candidate. Now suppose that
Q > ˆ Q. This implies that for some generator j:
(p − cj)(Q − K−j) > πc
j (3.8)
Therefore j at least will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to bid p and this becomes the market price. It is easy to
see that this equilibrium outcome price will maintain for any Q > ˆ Q.
3.3 Multiple Regions
Our focus in this section is to analyse, in terms of our model, the eﬀect of inter-regional competition
on the critical threshold we have established. A simple extension of the equilibrium analysis in
11Proposition 3.3 allows us to see that the increase in competition can potentially constrain the
eﬀective markups for generators in equilibrium. In this paper however we are more interested in
pinning down the threshold eﬀects.
We deﬁne inter-regional competition by assuming an agent with transfer capacity T, who per-
forms arbitrage on the diﬀerence between the prices in connected regions. In the absence of trans-
mission losses or transmission constraints, this would be equivalent to combining the two markets
and applying the same equilibrium properties described in Proposition 3.3. Let us illustrate this
argument. Suppose that there exist two regions, A and B with demand QA and QB. For each






n . We start by
letting regional prices pA,pB be determined as in Proposition 3.3. By consequence then we also
have an equivalent series of demand thresholds for each region, QA
1 ,QA
2 ,... and QB
1 ,QB
2 ,.... If we
take Q = QA+QB we can locate where total system demand lies in terms of the marginal generator.
Suppose without loss of generality that Q ∈ (Qj−1,Qj) and that j belongs to region 1. From a
strategic perspective we can see that the system marginal price will be cj+1, regardless of the region
to which j + 1 belongs. Let generator i2 be the highest in our ordering below j but belonging to
region B and let tA−B denote the ﬂow of electricity from region A to B. It is clear that
tA−B = (Q − Qj−1) + QA
j−1 − QA, (3.9)
which is equivalent to regional dispatch less regional demand. This condition holds as long as
|tA−B| ≤ T.
Without loss of generality, let us consider the case for generators in region A. We denote
j = argmaxi∈A ki as the largest generator. Now consider if demand QA is greater than the threshold
ˆ Q deﬁned in Proposition 3.3. For j to bid p, as in the single region case, is no longer a guaranteed
equilibrium as its bid may be undercut by any generator in B. In fact we can say unequivocally
that such a bid will be undercut until transmission is constrained either by the interconnector or





+ K−j + min{T,KB − QB}. (3.10)
Generally speaking, we can see that the eﬀect of inter-regional competition is to increase the
critical threshold by an amount equivalent to the import capacity of the region in question. For
more complicated systems we can make a recursive deﬁnition. In a network of indeterminate size





min{Tiω,Ki − Qi + Ii−ω} (3.11)
Where:
Ii−ω = Ii − min{Tωi,Ki − Qi + Iω−i} (3.12)
There are no problems with this recursive deﬁnition so long as we are guaranteed the existence of a
terminal node or region in the network. In the NEM the terminal nodes are Queensland, Tasmania
and South Australia. Using this deﬁnition of import capacity, we have the following.
Proposition 3.4. For a region ω with neighbours N(ω), there exists









such that the price in equilibrium is equal to the market maximum p when Q ≥ ˆ Qω and equal to
cj+1 when Q < ˆ Qω, Q ∈ (Qi−1,Qi] and regional demand is less than ˆ Qλ for every other region λ.
Proof. If Q > ˆ Qω it is easy to see that there exists j such that:
(p − cj)[Q − K−j − Iω] > πc
j (3.14)
And therefore j will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to bid its capacity at p. Finally, because transmission (Iω)
and the capacity of the remaining generators (K−i) are constrained, j cannot be undercut and p






< Q < ˆ Qω. It is no longer an
equilibrium for any generator j to bid p as there is an incentive for any of ω’s interconnectors to
undercut this bid, which persists as long as Q < K−j +Iω and the local threshold in any connected
region λ has not been exceeded.
We have seen then that the basic properties of our equilibrium analysis persist in the multi-
region case, with only a necessary redeﬁnition of the critical threshold ˆ Q.
3.4 Uncertainty
To this point our equilibrium analysis has assumed that the level of demand is known with certainty.
However von der Fehr and Harbord [26] have shown that, if any more than one generator sets the
13uniform price with positive probability, no pure strategy equilibrium can exist. It is important
then to consider the consequences of uncertainty in demand on our model. We will refer to the
density function of demand as g : [Q,Q] 7→ R, which we assume to be continuous. Let G be the
cumulative distribution. We imagine then that uncertainty in demand arises in the form of such a
stationary interval that increases and decreases with expected demand. In addition, we preserve all
of the assumptions that we have previously made, and refer to the set of thresholds characterised
in Proposition 3.3 as QT.
Chieﬂy we wish to demonstrate that the generator with the most market power has an incentive,
as demand approaches the threshold, to gradually shift capacity to it’s highest, or possibly a higher
price band. We will illustrate this with one particular example in pure strategies. Suppose that
QT ∩ suppg = { ˆ Q}, that Qj is the threshold immediately before ˆ Q and let m be the largest
generator, with m < j, such that m will be dispatched in either case. We therefore have two
generators with positive probability of setting market price, however we will ﬁnd that there can
still exist an equilibrium in pure strategies for this unique case. As Qj < [Q,Q] < Qj+1, the
equilibrium strategy for j + 1, as deﬁned by Proposition 3.3, is to bid capacity in at cj+2. This
maximises the proﬁt that can be obtained without providing an incentive for j+2 to undercut. We
suppose for now that this is the strategy pursued by j+2. Now consider m’s expected proﬁt across
the support of g. As Qm,Qm−1 / ∈ suppg, m’s best response is to bid some capacity at p1
m < cj+2,
and the rest at p. Note that it is neither proﬁtable for m to use any extra bid steps, nor for it to






. Expected proﬁt is now






[p − cm](Q − K−m)dG(Q). (3.15)
Thus, m’s optimal response is to choose q1∗
m = argmaxq1
m π(bm,bj+1). In previous cases, as in von
der Fehr and Harbord’s standard multi-unit model, the probability of m being dispatched at this
higher price yielded an incentive for the other eﬀective bidder (j + 1 in this case) to also raise its
bid, which increased the incentive for m to lower its bid ad inﬁnitum. In this case however, if j +1
were to raise it’s bid above cj+2, this would only serve to bring ﬁrm j + 2 into dispatch, thereby
decreasing j + 1’s proﬁts. We therefore have a Nash equilibrium as long as Q ≤ Qj+1 − (kj − q1∗
m).
If this condition does not hold, then j + 2 has a positive probability of being the marginal bidder,








+ (p − cm)
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we can see that the optimal choice of q1
m will decrease as the support of g shifts uniformly
upward, increasing the likelihood that m will face perfectly inelastic residual demand, thereby
decreasing the marginal beneﬁt from bidding q1
m competitively (the ﬁrst term on the left hand
side) and increasing the marginal beneﬁt from moving capacity to the higher band (the second
term). Accordingly, we have limQ→ ˆ Q q1
m = 0.
It is important to note that this modiﬁed situation is one in which Lemma 3.1 does not apply.
In this case Generator m can in fact guarantee itself a greater proﬁt with a two step bid than with
a single step bid. In other words, condition (3.1) no longer applies for m, as both steps of its bid
may determine proﬁt with a positive probability. We can see still though that conditions (3.1) and
(3.2) apply for any generator i 6= m. We have demonstrated here that, when facing uncertainty in
demand, the largest generator has an incentive to shift capacity to the highest price band as the
probability of threshold exceedance increases.
4 Analysis
Our equilibrium analysis has led us to the following conclusions regarding the behaviour of spot
price in the National Electricity Market. Firstly, that there exists a speciﬁable threshold in demand
where one generator has a strategic incentive to shift its capacity to the highest possible price band.
Secondly, that, when faced with uncertainty in demand, the equilibrium strategy for this generator
is to gradually shift capacity into higher price bands as demand approaches the threshold. Naturally,
the next step is to see if we can ﬁnd behaviour that ﬁts these general properties in the data.
Figures 4 and 4.2 show the general daily property we are seeking; that the spot price tends to
peak rapidly at a certain point in demand. This allows us to identify such a behaviour as exhibiting
a threshold property. We wish to discover if the speciﬁc demand threshold that we derived in our
theoretical analysis is close to this identiﬁed threshold.
15Figure 4.1: Scatter of Demand and Price, NSW, 5th February 2007
16Figure 4.2: Scatter of Demand and Price, NSW, 12th January 2007
174.1 Specifying the Threshold
We deﬁne the thresholds for each region according to that presented in Proposition 3.4, with the
following exception. We ﬁnd that for any generator i, the value of
πc
i
p−ci is suﬃciently close to 0 4
to exclude it from the speciﬁcation. Thus for example we have excluded Loy Yang A5 station for
Victoria and we get the following:
QV IC = KV IC − KLOY Y ANG A
+ min{TSNOWY −V IC,max{KNSW − DNSW,−TV IC−SNOW}}
+ min{TSA−V IC,max{KSA − DSA,−TV IC−SA}}
+ min{TTAS−V IC,max{KTAS − DTAS,−TV IC−TAS}}
(4.1)
Our goal is to see how this threshold speciﬁcation holds in particular price events.
4.2 Price Event Analysis
4.2.1 New South Wales, January 12, 2007
Our ﬁrst case study oﬀers a simple exposition of our central idea. Remembering always that
the changes we expect will come about in a probabilistic or gradual fashion due to uncertainty,
we can see that, in this case, the behaviour predicted by our model seems to hold. Figure 4.3
illustrates how price behaves as demand approaches then exceeds the threshold. We notice how
price begins to rapidly ascend as demand approaches QNSW, becoming more severe as ﬁrms
know DNSW > QNSW with certainty. Figure 4.4 shows this process over time, with the same
result. Additionally we can see that the shoulders of the price spike, at roughly 10:00am and
6:00pm respectively, correspond approximately well to the approach and retreat of demand from
the critical threshold QNSW. In terms of the model we can interpret this as the gradual shifting
of capacity to the maximum price band.
4It is usually less than 1.
5Loy Yang A is Victoria’s largest generating station which is rated at 2000MW.
18Figure 4.3: Price with QNSW (Red), January 12, 2007
19Figure 4.4: NSW, January 12, 2007
20Figure 4.5: NSW Aggregate Supply, January 12, 2007
21This is due to the fact that, as the probability of the state DNSW > QNSW increases, the
expected marginal beneﬁt from pricing at p6 increases. We can in fact explicitly observe this
gradual shifting in capacity to higher bands by examining the change in the aggregate bid stack
over time. Figure 4.5 shows the aggregation of NSW generators’ supply bids at 9:00 am, 12:00 pm,
2:30 pm and 4:00 pm. As we can see, between these times aggregate supply has shifted gradually
to the left as demand approaches, then travels beyond the threshold. This is again predicted by the
model. To ﬁnalise our test we can look at how the bids for the largest generator in NSW, Macquarie
Generation, change over this time period. Figure 4.6 shows that there is indeed a gradual shifting
of capacity to the maximum level over the period, which results in a shift to the left in the supply
curve. One speciﬁc issue with this type of analysis is that our theory predicts that once demand is
beyond the threshold with certainty, the largest generator will price all their capacity at the market
maximum. Figure 4.6 suggests such an outcome is a long way from realisation. A corollary to this
observation is that, given Macquarie is not shifting all of it’s capacity to the highest band, the price
spike must be supported by other generators holding capacity above the regional price, keeping it
from dispatch. This is not predicted by the model under certainty, however it does still ﬁt with our
characterization of the mixed strategy equilibria in uncertainty. We will discuss additional reasons
for such behaviour in §5.
4.2.2 New South Wales and Victoria, February 5, 2007
We look now at a particular case where demand exceeded the critical threshold for both New
South Wales and Victoria. We make the same observations as we did before regarding the timing of
the spike; when the demand series DV IC is suﬃciently beyond the threshold QV IC and simultane-
ously, DNSW has breached QNSW. Additionally we can see that the shoulders of the price spike
are timed fairly well with the approach and exceedance of the threshold level. It seems then that we
can successfully reapply our analysis for the previous case in terms of these characteristics. Figure
4.7 however requires some extra comment. Firstly, it illustrates nicely the critical importance of the
6And more generally, shifting capacity to higher price bands
22Figure 4.6: Macquarie Generation Aggregate Supply, January 12, 2007
23Figure 4.7: NSW and VIC, February 5, 2007
24Figure 4.8: VIC Aggregate Supply, February 5, 2007
connectedness between regions. Speciﬁcally we can see that in this case PV IC would have been
less likely to spike if the local threshold had not fallen between 9:00 am and 7:00 pm, bottoming
out at 3:30 pm, the time of the spike, thereby allowing demand to exceed it. The reason behind this
was exceptionally high levels of demand across the NEM, which necessarily constrained Victoria’s
import capacity. In accordance with the way we have deﬁned it, this change served to force down
the critical level of demand. This particular case provides a good illustration of the importance of
regional import capacity and particularly, the way that above average levels of demand across the
NEM can contribute to local price spike events.
Turning to bid analysis we ﬁnd that, although the movement in supply for New South Wales is
identical to that on January 12, supply changes in Victoria are more distinct. Figure 4.8 indicates
that the shift in Victorian supply is more of a ﬂattening than the parallel shift that we observe in
25Figure 4.9: Loy Yang A Aggregate Supply, February 5, 2007
New South Wales.
Figure 4.9 conﬁrms our expectations that Loy Yang A, the ﬁrm with the greatest combined capacity,
will shift this capacity to the highest allowable price as demand approaches the threshold. However
in contrast to observed behaviour in New South Wales on January 12, some ﬁrms appear to have
shifted more capacity into lower price bands, which causes the ﬂattening we see. It should be noted
that our expectations regarding changes in industry supply are entirely dependent on the degree
of uncertainty in demand. In this case, for example, if it is known with greater certainty that
demand will reach beyond the threshold, generators know with greater certainty that price will
spike regardless of their bids, increasing the marginal beneﬁt to bidding low and guaranteeing a
greater level of dispatch.
26Figure 4.10: Threshold Analysis: NSW and VIC, January 2007
4.3 General Analysis
One issue with our case study method is that it cannot support any notion that the principles of
the model hold in general. An intuitive response to this problem is simply to extend the breadth
of cases as succinctly as possible. Figures 4.10 and 4.11 display movements in price and demand in
New South Wales and Victoria relative to their local thresholds for January 2007.
In the spirit of our observations thus far, we can note the high level of coincidence in both
regions between exceedance of the threshold and the presence of a price spike. In addition, we can
see that any time there is a price spike unaccompanied by a breaking of the local threshold, it can
be explained by a breaking of the threshold in the other region. The 17th and 23rd of January
27Figure 4.11: Threshold Analysis: NSW and VIC, January 2007
28are two such examples. A couple of notable exceptions to our general hypothesis can be found at
times when the threshold in NSW is breached, but a contemporaneous spike in price cannot be
found. Looking at these days, we can see that abnormal prices do appear - visible as small humps
in the time series - but these increases are seemingly incommensurate with the magnitude of the
threshold break. Again, our equilibrium analysis suggests that this observation relates closely to
the level of uncertainty in demand at the time. Indeed, if we suppose the existence of a mixed
strategy equilibrium, we would expect a probabilistic response from price as demand approaches
then exceeds the threshold. Of course it is reasonable to expect that there are extra-theoretical
factors at play. We will discuss these in §5.
The most logical choice for applying further rigour and generality to our hypotheses would be
the use of statistical techniques. In developing a game-theoretic analysis of bidding strategies in the
NEM, we have in essence derived a structural model that could be used for econometric modelling.
In this case however we are less interested in ﬁtting data to our model than we are in testing the
general properties. An important problem in working with National Electricity Market data has
traditionally been an imposing degree of nonlinearity [7, 13, 27]. Negotiating these issues in order
to conduct a reliable hypothesis test on threshold eﬀects would therefore be a technically involved
process. We discuss the modeling options presented by the multi-unit approach in our conclusion.
We can however use simple regression techniques to illustrate the importance of threshold eﬀects











log(PV IC) = β2
0 + β2
1DV IC + β2
2DummyV IC + ￿2
t (4.4)
PV IC = γ2
0 + γ2
1DV IC + γ2
2DummyV IC + µ2
t (4.5)
Where the dummy variables are binary indicators that return a value of 1 if demand is above the
threshold for that region. We anticipate these models to have very little explanatory power as
they exclude inﬂuential factors that we have already discussed such as the level of demand in other
regions and interconnector constraints.
Table 4.3 shows estimates for the threshold coeﬃcients for each model. We can note that the







Value 0.745 585.74 3.432 8894.67
t-stat 29.35 39.82 10.67 68.21
Table 1: Threshold coeﬃcient estimates, NSW and VIC, 2007
price, particularly in New South Wales, to spike only probabilistically when demand is above the
threshold has been noted previously. This serves to mute the size of the threshold eﬀect, represented
by β1
2 and γ1
2, in the estimation for New South Wales.
5 Discussion
The model we have presented here has leant towards simplicity, allowing equilibrium analysis to
maintain clarity and precision. As always the cost of this simplicity is the omission of several
factors that may inﬂuence the accuracy of our theoretical framework. We will address some of
these extra-theoretical factors in this section, showing how they may explain the more critical
deviations between the model and our observations.
5.1 Hedging
Given the volatility of spot price in the NEM, and electricity markets more generally, both gen-
erators and retailers tend to hedge their operations with the use of various ﬁnancial instruments.
The use of such instruments to manage risk points to a gap in our theoretical framework. The
use of Contracts for Diﬀerence in particular poses a challenge. Commonly, a generator will have
a fraction of their capacity hedged under such a contract, wherein they pay or receive the diﬀer-
ence between the contract price and the spot price for the settlement period. A hedging strategy
such as this would clearly increase the magnitude of the critical threshold. For example suppose
that the largest generator faces completely inelastic residual demand and shifts it’s capacity to
p. For suﬃciently low levels of exceedance, this generator’s dispatch would be less than if it had
bid competitively and, under a suﬃciently extensive contract for diﬀerence, would in fact suﬀer a
loss in proﬁt. This intuition is veriﬁed by previous work in this area. For example, de Frutos and
Fabra [11] have shown that in the multi-unit auction, the introduction of contracts for diﬀerence
30can have pro-competitive eﬀects on price behaviour, but not strictly; they show that such contracts
may also assist small ﬁrms with anti-competitive behaviour. In what is potentially more relevant
work, Wolak [28, 30] has used the same structural estimation method as in [29] to provide empirical
evidence suggesting that the use of contracts for diﬀerence in the NEM has had a downward eﬀect
on prices. He suggests that future contract obligations may in fact help to decrease a generator’s
cost in production.
5.2 Cost Structure
There are two elements of a typical generation plant cost structure that we have ignored. The
ﬁrst of these is the possibility of increasing marginal costs. It is generally acceptable to assert that
costs for generation plants are constant at the margin. However, in general, marginal costs should
increase as plants approach their generation capacity.
It is easy to see that the threshold property is still maintained so long as the market maximum
p is higher than the marginal cost of production, which is a reasonable assumption. We would no
longer expect all capacity to be bid in at a particular price. In particular, we would expect equilibria
in which some capacity is held at the highest price band given the marginal cost of production at
this level of dispatch.
An equally important consideration is the operational constraints faced by generators. To some
extent, strategic movements in supply are limited by the ramp-up or ramp-down constraints of a
generator. For example, a coal ﬁred plant might be discouraged from sudden shifts in capacity as it
cannot aﬀord, either practically or ﬁnancially, to ramp-down or ramp-up its production as rapidly
as is suggested by the model. This also explains why hydroelectric plants, with virtually negligible
costs in this regard, are far more likely to rapidly withdraw and supply capacity at diﬀerent times
during the day. Looking back on our analysis, this is an additional possibility when it comes to
explaining the gradual movement of capacity to higher price bands, as well as the slow response of
spot prices to threshold exceedance. It supports the idea that generators should slowly shift their
capacity in anticipation of threshold exceedance.
315.3 Regulatory Factors
A notable omission from our theoretical considerations so far has been the presence of regulatory
risk in the auction game. The Australian Energy Regulator, under clause 3.13.17 (d) of the Na-
tional Electricity Rules (NER), is required to publish a report any time the spot price exceeds
$5000/MWh. It is speciﬁed in these rules that this report should assess whether any capacity
withdrawal or market rebids contributed to the high spot price, as well as identify the marginal
generating units and any units with capacity oﬀered above $5000/MWh. In addition to this reg-
ulatory measure, clauses 3.14.1 and 3.14.2 stipulate that the spot market may be suspended and
pricing administered if the cumulative price over the last 336 trading intervals (11.5 hours), exceeds
$150,000. This second measure, in particular, is a signiﬁcant disincentive to pricing at the market
maximum at every opportunity. Given that, as we have seen, demand can often spend multiple
hours above the critical threshold, exploiting this opportunity to the fullest possible extent would
always lead to a loss of proﬁt due to market suspension.
We can see then that there are dual risks to gaming in the National Electricity Market. There
is the risk of regulatory attention and even reproach if a ﬁrm’s rebids in capacity and high pricing
are found to be signiﬁcantly contributing to spikes in the spot price. Secondly there is the risk of
short term losses as a result of market suspension, which places a clear upper bound on the amount
of maximum pricing that is proﬁtable. The latter regulatory constraint is a good explanation for
the tempered response of prices to threshold exceedance that we have found in the data.
How can we expect rational agents to respond to these risks in the context of a game? Theoret-
ically, because we know little about the degree of ﬁrms’ risk aversion or the real costs of regulatory
action, this is hard to characterise precisely. We can say unambiguously that these new game pa-
rameters will temper price spikes in frequency and severity. In addition to this we expect that, in
such a setting, it is proﬁtable for generators to begin sharing regulatory risk. That is, price spikes
can occur more frequently if all generators partake in the shifting of capacity to higher price bands,
something that we observed in our bid analysis for New South Wales on January 12 and February
5.
There is an important consequence for equilibrium analysis if we allow for this behaviour. The
possibility of market suspension and regulatory reproach, depending on how we specify the game,
renders bids of p as suboptimal. Importantly, if multiple generators participate in such action as
32demand approaches the threshold, we are no longer guaranteed of a single optimal bid. As a result,
we no longer have a pure strategy equilibrium for generators facing completely inelastic residual
demand. Such a game permits the spot price to spike with variable magnitude when beyond the
threshold. Again, this serves as a plausible explanation for why such a pattern is observed in spiking
behaviour.
5.4 Tacit Collusion
Given its design as a frequently repeated auction with indeﬁnite horizon, the NEM (and electricity
markets more generally) is the type of market where tacit collusion between bidders is a possibility.
This issue has received some attention in the more general literature and it has been shown [10,
22, 20] that tacit collusion is generally sustainable in this type of auction, beyond a certain point
in demand. A recurring problem with tacit collusion results such as these is that they can only
identify a continuum of sustainable collusion paths over time. There is no real theoretical direction
for determining which path will actually be followed, which lessens the tractability of such a model.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have adapted von der Fehr and Harbord’s multi-unit auction model [26] for
settings applicable to Australia’s NEM. In doing so we have shown that, in this model, price
spikes are related to a speciﬁable threshold in demand. We have inspected the data for patterns of
behaviour that mirror the stylized facts established by the model, with positive results. Speciﬁcally,
we have found that price spikes do seem to relate convincingly to times of threshold exceedance.
In addition, we observe through speciﬁc price events that bid behaviour corresponds to that which
is predicted; generators gradually shift capacity to the highest price band as the probability of
threshold exceedance increases. Our initial ﬁndings indicate that the multi-unit auction may provide
the basis of a structural model for econometric analysis. There is deﬁnite scope, for example, for
the use of threshold regression techniques, such as those explored by Dagenais [9] and more recently
Hansen [16].
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